HighWEB-CMS-014Patch and Vulnerability ManagementWeb Apps

Joomla Core Past End of Life

Reads the installed Joomla version from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml on disk and compares it with the Joomla support dates.

Why It Matters: Joomla 3 left security support in August 2023 and Joomla 4 in October 2025. Sites on those series receive no fixes for new core vulnerabilities, while the exact version remains easy to fingerprint.
How It Detects: Reads <version> from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml under each local web root and fails when the series' end-of-support date has passed (1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.5, 3.x, 4.x). Joomla 5 and later pass.
How to Fix: Update to the current Joomla series through the Joomla Update component (back up first, check extension compatibility, then update), and keep the one-click updater enabled.
How to Verify: grep '<version>' administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml
CVSS v3.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Control Category: Patch and Vulnerability Management: CIS Controls v8 7, 2; NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA, PR.PS
Fix Effort: High
CIS Controls v8 Safeguard: 2.2
NIST CSF 2.0 Subcategory: ID.RA-01, PR.PS-02
CWE: CWE-1104
OWASP Top 10: A06:2021
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3: 14.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: SI-2, SA-22
References: Joomla Documentation, Joomla Release and Support Cycle
Joomla Documentation, Security Checklist

Learn the theory behind this check: P6 Information Exposure and Misconfiguration, P14 CMS Hardening in Depth: WordPress, Joomla and Drupal, A6 Application Framework and CMS Configuration.

Source Code

The complete file that defines this check. Run it with openvapt scan --only WEB-CMS-014, or read it offline with openvapt explain WEB-CMS-014.

internal/checks/web/cms_depth.go · Lines 1-298View on GitHub at This Commit

1package web
2
3import (
"context"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
8
"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/check"
"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/checks/collect"
"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/sys"
12)
13
14// Deeper CMS checks (WEB-CMS-012 and later): Drupal and Joomla lifecycle and
15// settings, Magento and Ghost modes, and two more WordPress exposures. Files
16// are found through the local web roots and read without following
17// symlinks; only version numbers and setting names reach the report.
18
19var (
refDrupalSettings = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Trusted Host settings", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/getting-started/installing-drupal/trusted-host-settings"}
refDrupalCoreEOL  = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Drupal core release cycle and end of life", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/about/core/policies/core-release-cycles/schedule"}
refDrupalUpdate   = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Running update.php (update_free_access)", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/updating-drupal/update-core-via-drush-or-manually"}
refJoomlaEOL      = check.Ref{Title: "Joomla Documentation, Joomla Release and Support Cycle", URL: "https://docs.joomla.org/Joomla!_CMS_versions"}
refMagentoModes   = check.Ref{Title: "Adobe Commerce documentation, Set the Magento mode", URL: "https://experienceleague.adobe.com/en/docs/commerce-operations/configuration-guide/cli/set-mode"}
refGhostConfig    = check.Ref{Title: "Ghost documentation, Configuration (url)", URL: "https://ghost.org/docs/config/"}
refWPCron         = check.Ref{Title: "WordPress Developer Resources, Hooking WP-Cron Into the System Task Scheduler", URL: "https://developer.wordpress.org/plugins/cron/hooking-wp-cron-into-the-system-task-scheduler/"}
refWPBrute        = check.Ref{Title: "WordPress Developer Resources, Brute Force Attacks", URL: "https://developer.wordpress.org/advanced-administration/security/brute-force/"}
28)
29
30// drupalEOL is the end of security coverage for each Drupal major, from the
31// Drupal core release schedule. Majors not listed are treated as supported.
32var drupalEOL = map[int]string{7: "2025-01-05", 8: "2020-11-02", 9: "2023-11-01"}
33
34// joomlaEOL is the end of security support for each Joomla series.
35var joomlaEOL = map[string]string{"1.5": "2012-09-27", "1.6": "2011-08-19", "1.7": "2012-02-24", "2.5": "2014-12-31", "3": "2023-08-17", "4": "2025-10-17"}
36
37// noFollowText reads a file under a web root without following a symlink.
38func noFollowText(ctx context.Context, s sys.System, p string) (string, bool) {
r, err := sys.ReadFileNoFollow(ctx, s, p)
if err != nil || !r.Complete {
return "", false
}
return string(r.Data), true
44}
45
46// perRoot runs judge for every document root that has the CMS, or skips.
47// judge returns (result, true) when the CMS is present under root.
48func perRoot(ctx context.Context, s sys.System, judge func(root string) (check.Result, bool), skipMsg string) []check.Result {
var out []check.Result
for _, root := range collect.DocRoots(ctx, s) {
if r, ok := judge(root); ok {
	out = append(out, r)
}
}
if len(out) == 0 {
return []check.Result{check.SkipR("web roots", skipMsg)}
}
return out
59}
60
61func init() {
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-012", Title: "Drupal Core Past End of Life", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatPatch, Effort: check.EffortHigh,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
Summary:   "Reads the installed Drupal core version from disk and compares its major release with the Drupal security coverage dates.",
Rationale: "Drupal 7, 8 and 9 no longer receive security advisories from the Drupal Security Team. Drupalgeddon (CVE-2014-3704) and Drupalgeddon 2 (CVE-2018-7600) showed how quickly unpatched Drupal sites are taken over at scale.",
Detection: "Reads core/lib/Drupal.php (const VERSION) or includes/bootstrap.inc (define('VERSION')) under each local web root and fails when the major release's end-of-life date has passed: 7 (2025-01-05), 8 (2020-11-02), 9 (2023-11-01).",
Fix:       "Upgrade to a supported Drupal major with composer (drupal/core-recommended), run drush updatedb and test the site; for Drupal 7, migrate with the Migrate module or commission a rebuild.",
Verify:    "drush status --field=drupal-version  or  grep VERSION core/lib/Drupal.php",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refDrupalCoreEOL, {Title: "NVD, CVE-2018-7600", URL: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2018-7600"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-1104"}, OWASP: []string{"A06:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.2.1"}, NIST: []string{"SI-2", "SA-22"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	d8 := regexp.MustCompile(`const VERSION = '(\d+)\.[\d.]+[^']*'`)
	d7 := regexp.MustCompile(`define\('VERSION', '(\d+)\.[\d.]+[^']*'\)`)
	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
		var m []string
		if t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/core/lib/Drupal.php"); ok {
			m = d8.FindStringSubmatch(t)
		} else if t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/includes/bootstrap.inc"); ok {
			m = d7.FindStringSubmatch(t)
		} else {
			return check.Result{}, false
		}
		if m == nil {
			return check.IncompleteR(root, "Drupal is installed but its version line was not recognised"), true
		}
		major, _ := strconv.Atoi(m[1])
		eol, known := drupalEOL[major]
		if known && eol <= today() {
			return check.FailR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" reached end of life on "+eol), true
		}
		if !known && major < 7 {
			return check.FailR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" is older than every supported release"), true
		}
		return check.PassR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" is a supported major release"), true
	}, "No Drupal installation found in the local web roots")
},
})
100
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-013", Title: "Drupal Trusted Host Patterns Not Set", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatWebApp, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
Summary:   "Checks Drupal settings.php for the trusted_host_patterns setting.",
Rationale: "Without trusted_host_patterns Drupal builds absolute links, including password reset links, from whatever Host header the request carries. An attacker who sends a crafted Host header can poison caches and redirect reset links to a domain they control.",
Detection: "Reads each sites/*/settings.php found through the web roots (comments removed) and fails when $settings['trusted_host_patterns'] is not assigned.",
Fix:       "Add to settings.php:  $settings['trusted_host_patterns'] = ['^www\\.example\\.com$', '^example\\.com$'];  then clear caches (drush cr). The status report page should no longer warn about trusted hosts.",
Verify:    "drush status-report | grep -i 'trusted host'",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refDrupalSettings, {Title: "OWASP WSTG-INPV-17, Testing for Host Header Injection", URL: "https://wstg.owasp.org/v4.2/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/17-Testing_for_Host_Header_Injection/"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-644", "CWE-346"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.4.1"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-INPV-17"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-10"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	trusted := regexp.MustCompile(`\$settings\[\s*['"]trusted_host_patterns['"]\s*\]\s*=`)
	return cmsCheck(ctx, s, "Drupal", func(c collect.CMSConfig) []string {
		if !trusted.MatchString(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(c.Text, "$1")) {
			return []string{"$settings['trusted_host_patterns'] is not set"}
		}
		return nil
	}, "Drupal accepts any Host header")
},
})
122
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-014", Title: "Joomla Core Past End of Life", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatPatch, Effort: check.EffortHigh,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
Summary:   "Reads the installed Joomla version from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml on disk and compares it with the Joomla support dates.",
Rationale: "Joomla 3 left security support in August 2023 and Joomla 4 in October 2025. Sites on those series receive no fixes for new core vulnerabilities, while the exact version remains easy to fingerprint.",
Detection: "Reads <version> from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml under each local web root and fails when the series' end-of-support date has passed (1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.5, 3.x, 4.x). Joomla 5 and later pass.",
Fix:       "Update to the current Joomla series through the Joomla Update component (back up first, check extension compatibility, then update), and keep the one-click updater enabled.",
Verify:    "grep '<version>' administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refJoomlaEOL, {Title: "Joomla Documentation, Security Checklist", URL: "https://docs.joomla.org/Security_Checklist"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-1104"}, OWASP: []string{"A06:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.2.1"}, NIST: []string{"SI-2", "SA-22"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	ver := regexp.MustCompile(`<version>\s*(\d+)\.(\d+)[^<]*</version>`)
	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
		t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml")
		if !ok {
			return check.Result{}, false
		}
		m := ver.FindStringSubmatch(collect.StripXMLComments(t))
		if m == nil {
			return check.IncompleteR(root, "Joomla manifest found but no version element"), true
		}
		v := m[1] + "." + m[2]
		eol, known := joomlaEOL[v]
		if !known {
			eol, known = joomlaEOL[m[1]]
		}
		if known && eol <= today() {
			return check.FailR(root, "Joomla "+v+" left security support on "+eol), true
		}
		return check.PassR(root, "Joomla "+v+" is a supported series"), true
	}, "No Joomla installation found in the local web roots")
},
})
157
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-015", Title: "Magento Not in Production Mode", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatExposure, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
Summary:   "Checks app/etc/env.php for a MAGE_MODE other than production.",
Rationale: "Developer and default modes show exceptions with stack traces and file paths to shoppers, disable static file signing and compile code on the fly. Adobe documents production as the only mode for a live store.",
Detection: "Reads app/etc/env.php in each local web root and its parent folder (Magento serves from pub/) and fails when 'MAGE_MODE' is developer or default.",
Fix:       "bin/magento deploy:mode:set production  (which also deploys static content and compiles DI), then clear caches. Keep developer mode for staging only.",
Verify:    "bin/magento deploy:mode:show  prints production.",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refMagentoModes, {Title: "Adobe Commerce documentation, Security best practices", URL: "https://experienceleague.adobe.com/en/docs/commerce-admin/systems/security/security-best-practices"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-489", "CWE-209"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.3.2"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-02", "WSTG-ERRH-01"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-11"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	mode := regexp.MustCompile(`['"]MAGE_MODE['"]\s*=>\s*['"]([a-z]+)['"]`)
	seen := map[string]bool{}
	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
		for _, p := range []string{root + "/app/etc/env.php", strings.TrimSuffix(root, "/pub") + "/app/etc/env.php"} {
			if seen[p] {
				continue
			}
			t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, p)
			if !ok {
				continue
			}
			seen[p] = true
			m := mode.FindStringSubmatch(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(t, "$1"))
			switch {
			case m == nil:
				return check.FailR(p, "MAGE_MODE is not set (default mode shows errors)"), true
			case m[1] != "production":
				return check.FailR(p, "MAGE_MODE is "+m[1]), true
			}
			return check.PassR(p, "MAGE_MODE is production"), true
		}
		return check.Result{}, false
	}, "No Magento installation found in the local web roots")
},
})
195
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-016", Title: "Ghost Configured With a Plain HTTP Site URL", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatWebApp, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
Summary:   "Checks Ghost config.production.json for a url that starts with http://.",
Rationale: "Ghost builds every link, including the admin login and member sign-in links, from the configured url. With http:// the admin session and members' tokens travel in the clear even when HTTPS is available, and browsers see mixed content.",
Detection: "Finds config.production.json files in the project folders that look like Ghost configuration (database and server keys) and fails when url begins with http://.",
Fix:       "ghost config url https://<your-domain>  (or edit config.production.json), set up TLS with ghost setup ssl or your reverse proxy, then ghost restart.",
Verify:    "ghost config get url  prints an https:// address.",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refGhostConfig, {Title: "OWASP Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet", URL: "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-319"}, OWASP: []string{"A02:2021", "A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"9.1.1"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CRYP-03"}, NIST: []string{"SC-8", "CM-6"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	urlRe := regexp.MustCompile(`"url"\s*:\s*"(https?)://`)
	paths := collect.ProjectFiles(ctx, s, "config.production.json")
	var out []check.Result
	for _, p := range paths {
		t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, p)
		if !ok || !strings.Contains(t, `"database"`) || !strings.Contains(t, `"server"`) {
			continue
		}
		m := urlRe.FindStringSubmatch(t)
		switch {
		case m == nil:
			out = append(out, check.IncompleteR(p, "No url setting found"))
		case m[1] == "http":
			out = append(out, check.FailR(p, "Ghost url uses plain http://"))
		default:
			out = append(out, check.PassR(p, "Ghost url uses https://"))
		}
	}
	if len(out) == 0 {
		return []check.Result{check.SkipR("projects", "No Ghost production configuration found")}
	}
	return out
},
})
232
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-017", Title: "WordPress Cron Reachable by Visitors", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.Info, Category: check.CatConfig, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
Summary:   "Reports whether /wp-cron.php answers to anonymous requests on WordPress sites. Informational.",
Rationale: "WP-Cron runs scheduled tasks when visitors load pages, and wp-cron.php can be requested directly. On busy or targeted sites that lets anyone make the server do work on demand, and it is a frequent target for resource exhaustion; a system cron job is the documented production setup.",
Detection: "Sends one GET for /wp-cron.php on each local site and reports a 200 response with an empty or non-HTML body (what wp-cron.php returns). Sites whose wp-config.php sets DISABLE_WP_CRON to true and block the file pass.",
Fix:       "Add define('DISABLE_WP_CRON', true); to wp-config.php, run  */5 * * * * www-data php /var/www/<site>/wp-cron.php  from the system cron (or curl the URL from cron), and deny direct requests to wp-cron.php at the web server.",
Verify:    "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://<site>/wp-cron.php  prints 403 or 404.",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refWPCron, refWPHardening},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-770"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-05"}, NIST: []string{"CM-7", "SC-5"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	return ForEachSite(ctx, s, func(st Site) check.Result {
		r, err := st.Get(ctx, s, "/wp-cron.php")
		if err == nil && r.Status == 200 && (strings.TrimSpace(r.Body) == "" || !HTML(r)) {
			return check.FailR(st.Name, "wp-cron.php answers anonymous requests")
		}
		return check.PassR(st.Name, "wp-cron.php is not reachable")
	})
},
})
254
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-018", Title: "WordPress Author Archive Reveals Login Names", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.Low, Category: check.CatExposure, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
Summary:   "Checks whether /?author=1 redirects to an author archive, which exposes the first account's login name in the address.",
Rationale: "The author archive address contains the user's slug, which by default equals the login name. Together with the REST API listing (WEB-CMS-003) this gives attackers the administrator's user name for password guessing without touching the login form.",
Detection: "Sends one GET for /?author=1 and fails on a 301 or 302 whose Location header contains /author/. The name itself is not written to the report.",
Fix:       "Return 404 for author queries by id (a small redirect rule or a security plugin's user enumeration protection), and give administrators a nickname and display name that differ from the login name.",
Verify:    "curl -sI https://<site>/?author=1 | grep -i location  prints nothing or a 404 page.",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refWPBrute, refWPHardening},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-204"}, OWASP: []string{"A07:2021"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-IDNT-04"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-11"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	return ForEachSite(ctx, s, func(st Site) check.Result {
		r, err := st.Get(ctx, s, "/?author=1")
		if err == nil && (r.Status == 301 || r.Status == 302) && strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Location"), "/author/") {
			return check.FailR(st.Name, "/?author=1 redirects to the author archive", "Location: .../author/<login-name>/")
		}
		return check.PassR(st.Name, "/?author=1 does not redirect to an archive")
	})
},
})
276
check.Register(&check.Check{
ID: "WEB-CMS-019", Title: "Drupal update.php Open Without Authentication", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatConfig, Effort: check.EffortLow,
CVSS:      "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
Summary:   "Checks Drupal settings.php for $settings['update_free_access'] = TRUE.",
Rationale: "update_free_access lets anyone run update.php, which executes database update hooks as the site. It exists for one-off maintenance and Drupal's own status report warns when it is left on.",
Detection: "Reads each sites/*/settings.php found through the web roots (comments removed) and fails when update_free_access is TRUE.",
Fix:       "Set $settings['update_free_access'] = FALSE; in settings.php (the default) and run updates as user 1 or with drush updatedb.",
Verify:    "grep update_free_access sites/default/settings.php  shows FALSE.",
Refs:      []check.Ref{refDrupalUpdate, {Title: "Drupal.org, Securing file permissions and ownership", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/administering-a-drupal-site/security-in-drupal/securing-file-permissions-and-ownership"}},
Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-306"}, OWASP: []string{"A01:2021", "A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"4.3.2"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-05"}, NIST: []string{"AC-3", "CM-6"}},
Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
	free := regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\$settings\[\s*['"]update_free_access['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*TRUE`)
	return cmsCheck(ctx, s, "Drupal", func(c collect.CMSConfig) []string {
		if free.MatchString(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(c.Text, "$1")) {
			return []string{"$settings['update_free_access'] is TRUE"}
		}
		return nil
	}, "Drupal update.php runs without authentication")
},
})
298}

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APA 7

OpenVAPT. (2026). WEB-CMS-014 Joomla Core Past End of Life (Version 0.1.0-alpha.6). OpenVAPT Check Catalogue. Retrieved October 16, 2026, from https://openvapt.com/checks/WEB-CMS-014.html

In text: (OpenVAPT, 2026). Accessed: the date shown is today's date from your own browser (the site's build date without JavaScript); change it to the day you read the page.

BibTeX

@misc{openvapt_web_cms_014,
  author       = {{OpenVAPT}},
  title        = {{WEB-CMS-014 Joomla Core Past End of Life}},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://openvapt.com/checks/WEB-CMS-014.html}},
  note         = {OpenVAPT Check Catalogue, version 0.1.0-alpha.6. Accessed 16 October 2026}
}

Accessed: the date shown is today's date from your own browser (the site's build date without JavaScript); change it to the day you read the page.

Citing OpenVAPT does not mean OpenVAPT endorses, approves or has reviewed your work.

Cite This Work: OpenVAPT. (2026). OpenVAPT: An open academic vulnerability assessment tool (Version 0.1.0-alpha.6) [Computer software]. https://github.com/OpenVAPT/openvapt

1	package web
2
3	import (
4	"context"
5	"regexp"
6	"strconv"
7	"strings"
8
9	"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/check"
10	"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/checks/collect"
11	"github.com/openvapt/openvapt/internal/sys"
12	)
13
14	// Deeper CMS checks (WEB-CMS-012 and later): Drupal and Joomla lifecycle and
15	// settings, Magento and Ghost modes, and two more WordPress exposures. Files
16	// are found through the local web roots and read without following
17	// symlinks; only version numbers and setting names reach the report.
18
19	var (
20	refDrupalSettings = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Trusted Host settings", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/getting-started/installing-drupal/trusted-host-settings"}
21	refDrupalCoreEOL = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Drupal core release cycle and end of life", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/about/core/policies/core-release-cycles/schedule"}
22	refDrupalUpdate = check.Ref{Title: "Drupal.org, Running update.php (update_free_access)", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/updating-drupal/update-core-via-drush-or-manually"}
23	refJoomlaEOL = check.Ref{Title: "Joomla Documentation, Joomla Release and Support Cycle", URL: "https://docs.joomla.org/Joomla!_CMS_versions"}
24	refMagentoModes = check.Ref{Title: "Adobe Commerce documentation, Set the Magento mode", URL: "https://experienceleague.adobe.com/en/docs/commerce-operations/configuration-guide/cli/set-mode"}
25	refGhostConfig = check.Ref{Title: "Ghost documentation, Configuration (url)", URL: "https://ghost.org/docs/config/"}
26	refWPCron = check.Ref{Title: "WordPress Developer Resources, Hooking WP-Cron Into the System Task Scheduler", URL: "https://developer.wordpress.org/plugins/cron/hooking-wp-cron-into-the-system-task-scheduler/"}
27	refWPBrute = check.Ref{Title: "WordPress Developer Resources, Brute Force Attacks", URL: "https://developer.wordpress.org/advanced-administration/security/brute-force/"}
28	)
29
30	// drupalEOL is the end of security coverage for each Drupal major, from the
31	// Drupal core release schedule. Majors not listed are treated as supported.
32	var drupalEOL = map[int]string{7: "2025-01-05", 8: "2020-11-02", 9: "2023-11-01"}
33
34	// joomlaEOL is the end of security support for each Joomla series.
35	var joomlaEOL = map[string]string{"1.5": "2012-09-27", "1.6": "2011-08-19", "1.7": "2012-02-24", "2.5": "2014-12-31", "3": "2023-08-17", "4": "2025-10-17"}
36
37	// noFollowText reads a file under a web root without following a symlink.
38	func noFollowText(ctx context.Context, s sys.System, p string) (string, bool) {
39	r, err := sys.ReadFileNoFollow(ctx, s, p)
40	if err != nil \|\| !r.Complete {
41	return "", false
42	}
43	return string(r.Data), true
44	}
45
46	// perRoot runs judge for every document root that has the CMS, or skips.
47	// judge returns (result, true) when the CMS is present under root.
48	func perRoot(ctx context.Context, s sys.System, judge func(root string) (check.Result, bool), skipMsg string) []check.Result {
49	var out []check.Result
50	for _, root := range collect.DocRoots(ctx, s) {
51	if r, ok := judge(root); ok {
52	out = append(out, r)
53	}
54	}
55	if len(out) == 0 {
56	return []check.Result{check.SkipR("web roots", skipMsg)}
57	}
58	return out
59	}
60
61	func init() {
62	check.Register(&check.Check{
63	ID: "WEB-CMS-012", Title: "Drupal Core Past End of Life", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
64	Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatPatch, Effort: check.EffortHigh,
65	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
66	Summary: "Reads the installed Drupal core version from disk and compares its major release with the Drupal security coverage dates.",
67	Rationale: "Drupal 7, 8 and 9 no longer receive security advisories from the Drupal Security Team. Drupalgeddon (CVE-2014-3704) and Drupalgeddon 2 (CVE-2018-7600) showed how quickly unpatched Drupal sites are taken over at scale.",
68	Detection: "Reads core/lib/Drupal.php (const VERSION) or includes/bootstrap.inc (define('VERSION')) under each local web root and fails when the major release's end-of-life date has passed: 7 (2025-01-05), 8 (2020-11-02), 9 (2023-11-01).",
69	Fix: "Upgrade to a supported Drupal major with composer (drupal/core-recommended), run drush updatedb and test the site; for Drupal 7, migrate with the Migrate module or commission a rebuild.",
70	Verify: "drush status --field=drupal-version or grep VERSION core/lib/Drupal.php",
71	Refs: []check.Ref{refDrupalCoreEOL, {Title: "NVD, CVE-2018-7600", URL: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2018-7600"}},
72	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-1104"}, OWASP: []string{"A06:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.2.1"}, NIST: []string{"SI-2", "SA-22"}},
73	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
74	d8 := regexp.MustCompile(`const VERSION = '(\d+)\.[\d.]+[^']*'`)
75	d7 := regexp.MustCompile(`define\('VERSION', '(\d+)\.[\d.]+[^']*'\)`)
76	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
77	var m []string
78	if t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/core/lib/Drupal.php"); ok {
79	m = d8.FindStringSubmatch(t)
80	} else if t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/includes/bootstrap.inc"); ok {
81	m = d7.FindStringSubmatch(t)
82	} else {
83	return check.Result{}, false
84	}
85	if m == nil {
86	return check.IncompleteR(root, "Drupal is installed but its version line was not recognised"), true
87	}
88	major, _ := strconv.Atoi(m[1])
89	eol, known := drupalEOL[major]
90	if known && eol <= today() {
91	return check.FailR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" reached end of life on "+eol), true
92	}
93	if !known && major < 7 {
94	return check.FailR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" is older than every supported release"), true
95	}
96	return check.PassR(root, "Drupal "+m[1]+" is a supported major release"), true
97	}, "No Drupal installation found in the local web roots")
98	},
99	})
100
101	check.Register(&check.Check{
102	ID: "WEB-CMS-013", Title: "Drupal Trusted Host Patterns Not Set", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
103	Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatWebApp, Effort: check.EffortLow,
104	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
105	Summary: "Checks Drupal settings.php for the trusted_host_patterns setting.",
106	Rationale: "Without trusted_host_patterns Drupal builds absolute links, including password reset links, from whatever Host header the request carries. An attacker who sends a crafted Host header can poison caches and redirect reset links to a domain they control.",
107	Detection: "Reads each sites/*/settings.php found through the web roots (comments removed) and fails when $settings['trusted_host_patterns'] is not assigned.",
108	Fix: "Add to settings.php: $settings['trusted_host_patterns'] = ['^www\\.example\\.com$', '^example\\.com$']; then clear caches (drush cr). The status report page should no longer warn about trusted hosts.",
109	Verify: "drush status-report \| grep -i 'trusted host'",
110	Refs: []check.Ref{refDrupalSettings, {Title: "OWASP WSTG-INPV-17, Testing for Host Header Injection", URL: "https://wstg.owasp.org/v4.2/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/17-Testing_for_Host_Header_Injection/"}},
111	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-644", "CWE-346"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.4.1"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-INPV-17"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-10"}},
112	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
113	trusted := regexp.MustCompile(`\$settings\[\s['"]trusted_host_patterns['"]\s\]\s*=`)
114	return cmsCheck(ctx, s, "Drupal", func(c collect.CMSConfig) []string {
115	if !trusted.MatchString(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(c.Text, "$1")) {
116	return []string{"$settings['trusted_host_patterns'] is not set"}
117	}
118	return nil
119	}, "Drupal accepts any Host header")
120	},
121	})
122
123	check.Register(&check.Check{
124	ID: "WEB-CMS-014", Title: "Joomla Core Past End of Life", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
125	Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatPatch, Effort: check.EffortHigh,
126	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
127	Summary: "Reads the installed Joomla version from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml on disk and compares it with the Joomla support dates.",
128	Rationale: "Joomla 3 left security support in August 2023 and Joomla 4 in October 2025. Sites on those series receive no fixes for new core vulnerabilities, while the exact version remains easy to fingerprint.",
129	Detection: "Reads <version> from administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml under each local web root and fails when the series' end-of-support date has passed (1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.5, 3.x, 4.x). Joomla 5 and later pass.",
130	Fix: "Update to the current Joomla series through the Joomla Update component (back up first, check extension compatibility, then update), and keep the one-click updater enabled.",
131	Verify: "grep '<version>' administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml",
132	Refs: []check.Ref{refJoomlaEOL, {Title: "Joomla Documentation, Security Checklist", URL: "https://docs.joomla.org/Security_Checklist"}},
133	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-1104"}, OWASP: []string{"A06:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.2.1"}, NIST: []string{"SI-2", "SA-22"}},
134	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
135	ver := regexp.MustCompile(`<version>\s(\d+)\.(\d+)[^<]</version>`)
136	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
137	t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, root+"/administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml")
138	if !ok {
139	return check.Result{}, false
140	}
141	m := ver.FindStringSubmatch(collect.StripXMLComments(t))
142	if m == nil {
143	return check.IncompleteR(root, "Joomla manifest found but no version element"), true
144	}
145	v := m[1] + "." + m[2]
146	eol, known := joomlaEOL[v]
147	if !known {
148	eol, known = joomlaEOL[m[1]]
149	}
150	if known && eol <= today() {
151	return check.FailR(root, "Joomla "+v+" left security support on "+eol), true
152	}
153	return check.PassR(root, "Joomla "+v+" is a supported series"), true
154	}, "No Joomla installation found in the local web roots")
155	},
156	})
157
158	check.Register(&check.Check{
159	ID: "WEB-CMS-015", Title: "Magento Not in Production Mode", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
160	Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatExposure, Effort: check.EffortLow,
161	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
162	Summary: "Checks app/etc/env.php for a MAGE_MODE other than production.",
163	Rationale: "Developer and default modes show exceptions with stack traces and file paths to shoppers, disable static file signing and compile code on the fly. Adobe documents production as the only mode for a live store.",
164	Detection: "Reads app/etc/env.php in each local web root and its parent folder (Magento serves from pub/) and fails when 'MAGE_MODE' is developer or default.",
165	Fix: "bin/magento deploy:mode:set production (which also deploys static content and compiles DI), then clear caches. Keep developer mode for staging only.",
166	Verify: "bin/magento deploy:mode:show prints production.",
167	Refs: []check.Ref{refMagentoModes, {Title: "Adobe Commerce documentation, Security best practices", URL: "https://experienceleague.adobe.com/en/docs/commerce-admin/systems/security/security-best-practices"}},
168	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-489", "CWE-209"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"14.3.2"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-02", "WSTG-ERRH-01"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-11"}},
169	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
170	mode := regexp.MustCompile(`['"]MAGE_MODE['"]\s=>\s['"]([a-z]+)['"]`)
171	seen := map[string]bool{}
172	return perRoot(ctx, s, func(root string) (check.Result, bool) {
173	for _, p := range []string{root + "/app/etc/env.php", strings.TrimSuffix(root, "/pub") + "/app/etc/env.php"} {
174	if seen[p] {
175	continue
176	}
177	t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, p)
178	if !ok {
179	continue
180	}
181	seen[p] = true
182	m := mode.FindStringSubmatch(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(t, "$1"))
183	switch {
184	case m == nil:
185	return check.FailR(p, "MAGE_MODE is not set (default mode shows errors)"), true
186	case m[1] != "production":
187	return check.FailR(p, "MAGE_MODE is "+m[1]), true
188	}
189	return check.PassR(p, "MAGE_MODE is production"), true
190	}
191	return check.Result{}, false
192	}, "No Magento installation found in the local web roots")
193	},
194	})
195
196	check.Register(&check.Check{
197	ID: "WEB-CMS-016", Title: "Ghost Configured With a Plain HTTP Site URL", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
198	Severity: check.Medium, Category: check.CatWebApp, Effort: check.EffortLow,
199	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
200	Summary: "Checks Ghost config.production.json for a url that starts with http://.",
201	Rationale: "Ghost builds every link, including the admin login and member sign-in links, from the configured url. With http:// the admin session and members' tokens travel in the clear even when HTTPS is available, and browsers see mixed content.",
202	Detection: "Finds config.production.json files in the project folders that look like Ghost configuration (database and server keys) and fails when url begins with http://.",
203	Fix: "ghost config url https://<your-domain> (or edit config.production.json), set up TLS with ghost setup ssl or your reverse proxy, then ghost restart.",
204	Verify: "ghost config get url prints an https:// address.",
205	Refs: []check.Ref{refGhostConfig, {Title: "OWASP Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet", URL: "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"}},
206	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-319"}, OWASP: []string{"A02:2021", "A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"9.1.1"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CRYP-03"}, NIST: []string{"SC-8", "CM-6"}},
207	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
208	urlRe := regexp.MustCompile(`"url"\s:\s"(https?)://`)
209	paths := collect.ProjectFiles(ctx, s, "config.production.json")
210	var out []check.Result
211	for _, p := range paths {
212	t, ok := noFollowText(ctx, s, p)
213	if !ok \|\| !strings.Contains(t, `"database"`) \|\| !strings.Contains(t, `"server"`) {
214	continue
215	}
216	m := urlRe.FindStringSubmatch(t)
217	switch {
218	case m == nil:
219	out = append(out, check.IncompleteR(p, "No url setting found"))
220	case m[1] == "http":
221	out = append(out, check.FailR(p, "Ghost url uses plain http://"))
222	default:
223	out = append(out, check.PassR(p, "Ghost url uses https://"))
224	}
225	}
226	if len(out) == 0 {
227	return []check.Result{check.SkipR("projects", "No Ghost production configuration found")}
228	}
229	return out
230	},
231	})
232
233	check.Register(&check.Check{
234	ID: "WEB-CMS-017", Title: "WordPress Cron Reachable by Visitors", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
235	Severity: check.Info, Category: check.CatConfig, Effort: check.EffortLow,
236	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
237	Summary: "Reports whether /wp-cron.php answers to anonymous requests on WordPress sites. Informational.",
238	Rationale: "WP-Cron runs scheduled tasks when visitors load pages, and wp-cron.php can be requested directly. On busy or targeted sites that lets anyone make the server do work on demand, and it is a frequent target for resource exhaustion; a system cron job is the documented production setup.",
239	Detection: "Sends one GET for /wp-cron.php on each local site and reports a 200 response with an empty or non-HTML body (what wp-cron.php returns). Sites whose wp-config.php sets DISABLE_WP_CRON to true and block the file pass.",
240	Fix: "Add define('DISABLE_WP_CRON', true); to wp-config.php, run /5 * * * www-data php /var/www/<site>/wp-cron.php from the system cron (or curl the URL from cron), and deny direct requests to wp-cron.php at the web server.",
241	Verify: "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://<site>/wp-cron.php prints 403 or 404.",
242	Refs: []check.Ref{refWPCron, refWPHardening},
243	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-770"}, OWASP: []string{"A05:2021"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-05"}, NIST: []string{"CM-7", "SC-5"}},
244	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
245	return ForEachSite(ctx, s, func(st Site) check.Result {
246	r, err := st.Get(ctx, s, "/wp-cron.php")
247	if err == nil && r.Status == 200 && (strings.TrimSpace(r.Body) == "" \|\| !HTML(r)) {
248	return check.FailR(st.Name, "wp-cron.php answers anonymous requests")
249	}
250	return check.PassR(st.Name, "wp-cron.php is not reachable")
251	})
252	},
253	})
254
255	check.Register(&check.Check{
256	ID: "WEB-CMS-018", Title: "WordPress Author Archive Reveals Login Names", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
257	Severity: check.Low, Category: check.CatExposure, Effort: check.EffortLow,
258	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
259	Summary: "Checks whether /?author=1 redirects to an author archive, which exposes the first account's login name in the address.",
260	Rationale: "The author archive address contains the user's slug, which by default equals the login name. Together with the REST API listing (WEB-CMS-003) this gives attackers the administrator's user name for password guessing without touching the login form.",
261	Detection: "Sends one GET for /?author=1 and fails on a 301 or 302 whose Location header contains /author/. The name itself is not written to the report.",
262	Fix: "Return 404 for author queries by id (a small redirect rule or a security plugin's user enumeration protection), and give administrators a nickname and display name that differ from the login name.",
263	Verify: "curl -sI https://<site>/?author=1 \| grep -i location prints nothing or a 404 page.",
264	Refs: []check.Ref{refWPBrute, refWPHardening},
265	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-204"}, OWASP: []string{"A07:2021"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-IDNT-04"}, NIST: []string{"CM-6", "SI-11"}},
266	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
267	return ForEachSite(ctx, s, func(st Site) check.Result {
268	r, err := st.Get(ctx, s, "/?author=1")
269	if err == nil && (r.Status == 301 \|\| r.Status == 302) && strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Location"), "/author/") {
270	return check.FailR(st.Name, "/?author=1 redirects to the author archive", "Location: .../author/<login-name>/")
271	}
272	return check.PassR(st.Name, "/?author=1 does not redirect to an archive")
273	})
274	},
275	})
276
277	check.Register(&check.Check{
278	ID: "WEB-CMS-019", Title: "Drupal update.php Open Without Authentication", Domain: check.DomainWeb,
279	Severity: check.High, Category: check.CatConfig, Effort: check.EffortLow,
280	CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
281	Summary: "Checks Drupal settings.php for $settings['update_free_access'] = TRUE.",
282	Rationale: "update_free_access lets anyone run update.php, which executes database update hooks as the site. It exists for one-off maintenance and Drupal's own status report warns when it is left on.",
283	Detection: "Reads each sites/*/settings.php found through the web roots (comments removed) and fails when update_free_access is TRUE.",
284	Fix: "Set $settings['update_free_access'] = FALSE; in settings.php (the default) and run updates as user 1 or with drush updatedb.",
285	Verify: "grep update_free_access sites/default/settings.php shows FALSE.",
286	Refs: []check.Ref{refDrupalUpdate, {Title: "Drupal.org, Securing file permissions and ownership", URL: "https://www.drupal.org/docs/administering-a-drupal-site/security-in-drupal/securing-file-permissions-and-ownership"}},
287	Standards: check.Standards{CWE: []string{"CWE-306"}, OWASP: []string{"A01:2021", "A05:2021"}, ASVS: []string{"4.3.2"}, WSTG: []string{"WSTG-CONF-05"}, NIST: []string{"AC-3", "CM-6"}},
288	Run: func(ctx context.Context, s sys.System) []check.Result {
289	free := regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\$settings\[\s['"]update_free_access['"]\s\]\s=\sTRUE`)
290	return cmsCheck(ctx, s, "Drupal", func(c collect.CMSConfig) []string {
291	if free.MatchString(phpComment.ReplaceAllString(c.Text, "$1")) {
292	return []string{"$settings['update_free_access'] is TRUE"}
293	}
294	return nil
295	}, "Drupal update.php runs without authentication")
296	},
297	})
298	}